On overcoming the culture-nature divide : a panpsychist proposal by Leidenhag, Joanna
  
 
 
On overcoming the culture-nature divide:  
a panpsychist proposal 
Joanna Leidenhag 
 
 
 
Date of deposit 17 02 2020 
Document version Author’s accepted manuscript 
Access rights Copyright © 2020 Cambridge University Press. Published by 
Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. This work has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies or 
with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content 
should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is 
the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and 
may differ slightly from the final published version. 
Citation for 
published version 
Leidenhag, J 2020, 'On overcoming the culture-nature divide: a 
panpsychist proposal', Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. In press. 
Link to published 
version 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/scottish-journal-of-
theology 
 
 
Full metadata for this item is available in St Andrews Research 
Repository at: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
1 | P a g e  
 
On Overcoming the Culture-Nature Divide: A Panpsychist Proposal 
 
 
Abstract  
Within the recently published volumes, Knowing Creation and Christ and the Created Order, several 
authors argue that the theological category of creation can help contemporary society overcome 
the modern, and ecologically harmful, bifurcation between nature and culture. This paper 
supplements this important argument by showing how theological panpsychism, an ontology 
inspired by current debates within analytic philosophy of mind, can help theologians articulate a 
metaphysically robust and Trinitarian doctrine of creation.  
Keywords: Creation, Panpsychism, Nature, Culture, Environment.  
Introduction 
The recent twin volumes Knowing Creation and Christ and the Created Order edited by Andrew B. 
Torrance and Thomas H. McCall bring scholars from biblical studies, theology, philosophy and 
natural science, together to discuss how investigation into the external world might be 
considered under the matrix of ‘creation’, over which Jesus Christ is Lord. One argument that 
emerges as a red thread throughout these volumes, and is representative of a wider trend within 
contemporary research on the doctrine of creation, is that ‘creation’ should be considered a 
category that supersedes, or reunites, any nature-vs.-culture bifurcation. Creation is made 
through Christ in whom all things, natural and cultural, hold together (Col 1:15-17). The first 
section of this paper will unpack how the categories of ‘nature’, ‘culture’ and ‘creation’ are 
defined within this argument. It is seen that, within a broadly Aristotelian tradition, the paradigm 
of ‘creation’ presupposes that ‘culture’ is always already located and subsumed within ‘nature’, 
but not vice versa. The resulting theology of creation requires that the world be interpreted, heard, 
and encountered as pregnant with purpose and meaning. It is not the intention of this paper to 
critique this argument, but to follow its implications and use philosophy of mind to facilitate a 
robust articulation of this encultured natural world. 
The environmental devastation that the division between nature and culture has wrought 
demands that theologians seriously consider any tools from other disciplines which help support 
the identification of the world as creation. One such tool can be found in theories within 
philosophy of mind that seek to overcome parallel bifurcations between matter and mind, and 
even between monism and dualism. Although not the only such philosophy considered in these 
volumes, panpsychism is one such theory. Panpsychism has been undergoing a revival of 
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attention within analytic philosophy of mind in the last few decades and it is the argument of this 
paper that a theologically rich version of panpsychism provides the best ontological platform for 
overcoming the nature/culture divide. The second section of this paper summarises what is 
meant by panpsychism and argues for the possibility of a ‘theological panpsychism’, which is 
different from its naturalistic, pantheist, panentheistic, and Process alternatives. The third section 
then completes the argument by showing how theological panpsychism facilitates a doctrine of 
creation that holds nature and culture together by undergirding a cultic and perichoretic vision of 
the psychophysical world. This paper concludes that theologians, such as those within Knowing 
Creation and Christ and the Created Order, who wish to employ the doctrine of creation as an 
antidote to the destructive nature/culture bifurcation in Western modernity should be open to 
receiving aid from theological panpsychism. 
The Encultural Nature of Creation 
One contemporary theologian who has championed the idea that creation unites nature and 
culture is Simon Oliver, whose opening chapter of Knowing Creation is my launching pad. Oliver 
articulates creation ex nihilo as a doctrine that is best understood with, if not tied to, an 
Aristotelian powers-ontology. It is only in conjunction with the aid of Aristotelian metaphysics, 
for Oliver, that the full benefit of the concept of ‘creation’ as uniting nature and culture can be 
seen. According to Aristotle, ‘nature’ refers to those things that have ‘a nature’, that is that have 
“an intrinsic principle of change towards the actualisation of fulfilment of that nature”.1 On this 
view, the definition of ‘nature’ is fundamentally purpose-driven and empowered from within. 
‘Culture’, by contrast, is the world of artifice that can only mimic the purposefulness of nature as 
natural creators, such as human beings, impose purpose and meaning from without. What we 
have here is a fundamental difference between the types of things God creates, which we call 
‘nature’, and the types of things humanity can make, which we call ‘culture’. It is because human-
made ‘culture’ is a subset of God-made ‘nature’ that both nature and culture participate in and 
are subsumed under the more fundamental category of ‘creation’, which Oliver defines as the 
primordial giftedness of all things. 
Oliver, Christoph Schwöbel, Robert C. Koons, and William M.R. Simpson all agree that with the 
fall of Aristotelian scholasticism and the rise of corpuscular mechanism in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century Europe, the philosophy underpinning the doctrine of creation was lost. For 
 
1 Simon Oliver, “Every Good and Perfect Gift is from Above: Creation Ex Nihilo before Nature and Culture,” in 
Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 27. 
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Oliver, this loss is primarily located in the reversal of the Aristotelian priority of nature over 
culture, such that Christian theology became unable to bind both within the overarching category 
of creation. This reversal is captured in the interpretation of nature as a clockwork mechanism, 
mimicking an artefact of human culture. Schwöbel also decries the metaphor of nature as a 
clockwork machine that is known through quantitative measurements of noncommunicative 
forces because it has displaced the metaphor of ‘the book of nature’ whose “natural signs” (to 
use C. Stephan Evan’s term) requires the book of Scripture and the practices of the church as 
hermeneutical keys.2 As James K.A. Smith argues, it is when we falsely identify science with 
‘nature’, rather than as a cultural institution or set of cultural practices, that our academies 
become overrun with the scientism and naturalism that are opposed to theology; and so, again, 
‘creation’ is forgotten.3  
At the heart of the reversal in priority is the split of mind from matter, such that nature becomes 
the raw material for human culture, empty of purpose and meaning in and of itself, silently 
waiting to be moulded by some external mind, human or divine. As Norman Wirzba writes the 
separation between body and soul, “extends to a separation between nature and culture, which in 
turn underwrites a separation between creatures and their places.” 4  He goes on to argue that 
this priority of culture in opposition to nature has had the effect in theology of “locating and 
confining Christ’s work in the human realm”, thus forgetting Jesus’ role as Creator.5  
A number of authors point to how this reversal and rupture between nature and culture, as well 
as the material and the mental, has precipitated humanity’s exploitation of the environment. In 
addition, Oliver points out that this bifurcation persists even in our well-intended responses to 
lessen the environmental crisis, which vacillate between submitting to romantic notions of ‘pure 
nature’ and extending our cultural control to save the environment.6 The solution, Oliver argues, 
is to return to the category of ‘creation’, and emphasise the primordial and unilateral gift from 
the Father. Creation is not a gift given to humanity, as if we stood apart from ‘nature’ receiving a 
 
2 Christoph Schwöbel, “‘We Are All God’s Vocabulary’: The Idea of Creation as a Speech-Act of the Trinitarian 
God and Its Significance for the Dialogue between Theology and Sciences,” in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from 
Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 
53-54. Stephan C. Evans, “Are We Hardwired to Believe in God? Natural Signs for God, Evolution, and the Sensus 
Divinitatis,” in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas 
McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018),  195-204. James K.A. Smith, “Our Chalcedonian Moment: 
Christological Imagination for Scientific Challenges,” in Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, 
and Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 192-93.  
3 Smith, “Our Chalcedonian Moment,” 185-87. 
4 Norman Wirzba, “Creation through Christ,” in Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and 
Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 46. 
5 Wirzba, “Creation through Christ,” 47. 
6 Oliver, “Every Good,” 30. Cf. John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997), 257-67.  
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material object to use and play with. Creation is a gift that establishes the being and existence 
even of the recipient, which includes humanity, in such a way that creatures are able to receive 
further gifts; creation is “a gift of a gift to a gift.”7 Creation is a gift that keeps on receiving. 
Therefore, Oliver goes on to say, for creation to be fundamentally itself, creatures must respond 
in thanks and praise.8 Creation as a unilateral gift, then, opens up the possibility of a reciprocal 
Creator-creature conversation. 
The portrayal of reciprocity between Creator and creature as a form of communication is a major 
theme for several authors. Christoph Schwöbel’s chapter reflects upon the ability of the cultural 
metaphors we use to characterise ‘nature’ to “act on us” and “change the way things are for us 
and how we are to relate to them”.9 From here Schwöbel describes ‘creation’ as God’s “speech-
act”, a metaphor that holds cultural meaning and natural being together, and demands 
hermeneutical interpretation.10 Creation is the “address of the Creator,” Schwöbel argues citing 
Ps 19:1-4, that simultaneously “invests creation with the capacity to respond to God in praise.”11 
As Susan Grove Eastman writes, this gift “proceeds from the desire of the giver, not the 
capacities of ‘fittingness’ of the receivers.”12 The divine presence and speech-act is a gift that 
creates an I-Thou conversation, such that “not only human beings but the whole of creation” 
speak God’s glory such that, “nothing is without language (1 Cor. 14:10b).”13 This is revealed, 
Schwöbel continues, in the very materiality of creation as the Word becomes a material body and 
binds the Spirit’s activity to that material body, “negating all dualisms between mind and matter, 
Spirit and flesh”.14  
The use of creaturely ‘speech’ to negate the dualisms of culture-nature, mind-matter, human-
nonhuman,  is perhaps most fully explored by Mark Harris in his chapter on the “woefully-
neglected” Scriptural references to the voices of the nonhuman, even inanimate, features of 
 
7 Oliver, “Every Good,” 31.  
8 Oliver, “Every Good,” 40.  
9 Schwöbel, “‘We Are All’,” 48-49. 
10 Schwöbel “‘We Are All’,” 51, 57.  
11 Schwöbel “‘We Are All’,” 50.  
12 Susan Grove Eastman, “Knowing and Being Known: Interpersonal Cognition and the Knowledge of God in 
Paul’s Letters,” in in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and 
Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 164.  
13 Schwöbel, “‘We Are All’,” 51. Eastman, “Knowing and Being Known,” 169. cf. Paul K. Moser, “Convictional 
Knowledge, Science, and the Spirit of Christ,” in Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and 
Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 207. The need for 
human beings to recognise “the ‘thou-ness’ in all beings,” is a central part of eco-feminist theologies of creation also. 
See, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (London: SCM Press, 1983), 87. Sallie 
McFague, Super, Natural Christians: How we should love nature (London: SCM Press, 1997), 1ff.  
14 Schwöbel, “‘We Are All’,” 62.  
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nature.15 Since these references are mostly found in Hebrew poetry the reader might be tempted 
to dismiss such passages as “poetic fancy”.16 Harris, however, warns against this “hasty 
anthropocentrism”, which is underpinned by the “massive inconsistency of treating nature 
naturalistically but not humans.”17 This, again, reveals the tendency to bifurcate the natural and 
the cultural, which is to be resisted. Now, of course, the Scriptural passages that attribute speech to 
the nonhuman world employ poetic personification and metaphor but, as Schwöbel unpacks, 
such use of language is not meaningless, without referent, or without implications for our 
knowing and acting in the world. Instead, the use of metaphor may point “to a reality embodied 
in the physical world, one that contemporary Western minds are not usually trained to 
comprehend.”18 Indeed, Harris highlights that the Psalmist articulates this very problem of 
metaphorical realism in Ps 19:1-4:  
The heavens are telling the glory of God; 
and the firmament proclaims his handiwork. 
Day to day pours forth speech,  
and night to night declares knowledge.  
There is no speech, nor are there words;  
their voice is not heard;  
yet their voice goes out through all the earth, 
 and their words to the end of the world (NRSV). 
 
We should neither suppose that the Psalmist, then, was expecting to audibly hear a literal human 
voice echo throughout the starry sky, nor should we then dismiss these passages as not telling us 
something important about how the author understands the ontology and purpose of creation.19 
For despite having neither voice nor words, the author still insists that nonhuman, inanimate 
nature praises God. 
 
15 Mark Harris, “‘The Trees of the Field Shall Clap Their Hands’ (Isaiah 55:12): What Does It Mean to Say That a 
Tree Praises God?,” in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and 
Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 288.  
16 Harris, “‘The Trees’,” 291-92.  
17 Harris “‘The Tree’,” 304. 
18 Howard N. Wallace, “‘Jubilate Deo omnis terra’: God and Earth in Psalm 65,” in The Earth Story in the Psalms and the 
Prophets, ed. Norman C. Habel (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 63. 
19 For a classic text on this question see Terrene E. Fretheim, “Nature’s Praise of God in the Psalms,” Ex Auditu 3 
(1987): 16-30. More discussions can be found in Richard Bauckham, “Joining Nature’s Praise of God,” Ecotheology 7 
(2002): 45-59; Dominic Coad, “Creation’s praise of God: A proposal for a theology of the non-human creation,” 
Theology (May/June 2009): 181-189; and Rachel Muers. “The Holy Spirit, the voices of nature and environmental 
prophecy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 67 (2014): 323-339.  
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Theological Panpsychism  
Thus far, I have reconstructed the argument from across these two volumes that the concept of 
‘creation’, as primordial gift and a divine speech-act that creates the possibility for reciprocity, 
holds the categories ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ together, by viewing the natural world as intrinsically 
encultured. Within these volumes panpsychism receives occasional attention. In addition to Mark 
Harris’s more explicit consideration of a panpsychist interpretation of Scripture, Marilyn McCord 
Adams notes and welcomes the turn of prominent philosophers away from materialism to 
panpsychism, and there some discussion of the neighbouring (but not identical) position of 
animism in Norman Wirzba’s chapter.20 But what is panpsychism, and should theologians 
seriously be considering it as part of the doctrine of creation? The following section will define 
panpsychism, demarcate it from neighbouring positions in philosophy of mind, and defensively 
show its neutrality with regards to philosophy of religion.  
‘Panpsychism’, is a compound word that can be translated to mean that everything (pan) is 
mental (psyche), which is not identical to the claims of animism, vitalism or idealism. A popular 
definition amongst contemporary panpsychists is that “mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous 
in the natural world”.21 To say that mentality is fundamental is to say that it can neither be 
explained nor reduced to anything non-mental. It is this fundamentality claim that differentiates 
panpsychism from physicalism and emergentism, both of which claim that physicality alone is 
fundamental to reality. One route to panpsychism, common amongst contemporary analytic 
philosophers, is to become incredulous to the possibility of mentality reducing into or emerging 
out of that which is entirely non-mental. Instead, it is argued, the potential or ingredients for 
such emergence or combination, must be found within the basic structures of reality.22 Thus, 
most definitions of panpsychism presuppose the existence of the material world and merely add 
mentality to this physicalist picture; “the view that the basic physical constituents of the universe 
 
20 Marilyn McCord Adams, “Sanctifying Matter,” in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, 
eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 172, n.4. Wirzba, “Creation 
through Christ”, 48. A similar welcome for further engagement between the panpsychism of Galen Strawson and the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo, has been made in Janet Soskice, “Why Creation ex nihilo for Theology Today?,” in 
Creation ex nihilo: Origin, Development, Contemporary Challenges, eds. Gary A. Anderson and Markus Bockmuehl (Notre 
Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2018), 50-51.  
21 Philip Goff, William Seager & Sean Allen-Hermanson, “Panpsychism,” in The Stanford Encyclopaedia (Winter 2017), 
ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.standford.edu/archvies/win2017/entries/panpsychism/. 
22 As panpsychist philosopher Sam Coleman characterises this argument (sometimes known as The Genetic 
Argument) for panpsychism, “there must be some secret properties of matter with a direct connection to 
consciousness, such that when you put matter together in the right way, as a brain (and perhaps a body too), you get 
a conscious being.” Sam Coleman, “The Evolution of Nagel’s Panpsychism,” Klesis 41 (2018) :185.  
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have mental properties”, or “physical nature is composed of individuals, each of which is to 
some degree sentient . . . [has] experience, or in a broad sense, consciousness.”23 
What is often overlooked in contemporary philosophical literature is that, if one were only to 
define panpsychism as the claim that mentality is fundamental, then panpsychism would not yet 
been demarcated from traditional substance dualism or hylomorphism, both of which also state 
that mentality can neither be explained nor reduced to anything non-mental. Both traditional 
substance dualists and hylomorphists tend to be theists because the explanation for the mentality 
of organisms is most often that God directly bestows mentality, as either souls or forms, to the 
appropriate organism such that to have this particular type of soul or form is fundamental and 
essential to the organism in question. As Robert C. Koons in Knowing Creation writes, for a 
hylomorphist “there are metaphysically fundamental entities at multiple levels of scale.”24 By 
contrast, panpsychists typically hold to fundamental monism; the principle that there is only one 
fundamental level of reality. This precludes explanations which posit that God creates 
fundamental phenomena, like minds, ex nihilo after the initial ex nihilo act of creation. This is not 
because God is considered unable to construct the world in this piecemeal fashion, since a 
panpsychist can hold that God’s original and once-and-for-all act of creation was out of nothing 
and so secure the freedom and omnipotence of God absolutely. Instead, it is the principle of 
fundamental monism, which is a principle regarding creation and not one that limits God, that 
precludes multiple origins for fundamental phenomena. Fundamental monism is, when viewed 
theologically, a way of claiming that when God created the universe, God created all the 
fundamental features of the universe at once.  And thus, if mentality is fundamental for a 
panpsychist, it is also likely to be ubiquitous. Panpsychism then is best considered a form of 
neutral monism, or property dualism, or possibly a ‘unified substance dualism’, whereby the 
material and mental are always found together and cannot be separated.  
How can physicality and mentality be so unified? To modern neo-Cartesian definitions of 
‘mental’ and ‘physical’, panpsychism seems counterintuitive, perhaps even contradictory. Yet, as 
Galen Strawson points out, “we have no good reason to think that we know anything about the 
physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that mental phenomena are 
physical phenomena.”25 This is not because the mind can be reduced to the functional 
 
23 Thomas Nagel, Moral Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 181. Timothy L.S. Sprigge, 
“Panpsychism,” in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Taylor and Francis: 1998), 
<https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/panpsychism/v-1>.  
24 Robert C. Koons, “Knowing Nature: Aristotle, God and the Quantum,” in Knowing Creation: Perspectives from 
Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
2018), 220.  
25 Galen Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 20, 39.  
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interaction of physical parts, but because even the physical – properly understood – cannot be 
exhaustively described by physics.26 This is something theologians have been arguing for a long 
time, and is a core part of the central argument discussed in this paper, that nature is encultured, 
filled with meaning and purpose, and, therefore, best known when it is known as creation. 
Within this broad definition of panpsychism there are many specific versions.  Panpsychist 
theories can be found throughout Western philosophy since the pre-Hellenistic period as well as 
in the lively debate currently going on within analytic philosophy of mind.27 The differences 
between the specific versions of panpsychism currently debated can be distilled into three pivotal 
questions. All panpsychists must choose an answer to each question, and the combination of 
answers one elects determines the variety of panpsychism that a philosopher can be said to hold. 
These questions are: (1) What sought of mentality is it that is posited as fundamental? (2) Where 
is the fundamental level of reality? (3) What type of relation holds between fundamental 
mentality and the type of mentality enjoyed by humanity? This paper does not have the space to 
explore the resulting variations of panpsychism but will discuss the first two of these pivotal 
questions in order to outline important features of, what I call, theological panpsychism.28 
In answer to the first question it is important to note that no contemporary panpsychist (and a 
very few historical panpsychists) posit self-consciousness, rationality, emotion, free-will or other 
complex mentality functions that humans enjoy as fundamental. Instead, responses to this 
question can be placed in three categories; subject panpsychists, panexperientialists, and 
panprotopsychists. Subject panpsychism hold that there are basic subjects with raw experiences 
at the fundamental level; that is a first-person perspective such that there is something it is like to 
 
26 Whilst the experiential properties of mentality can be known (not perfectly, but) directly and immediately such 
that we have a secure intuitive grasp on their reality and nature, the non-experiential properties of matter are a step 
removed from our experience (since, they are by definition, non-experiential). In light of this asymmetry, humanity 
employs the physical sciences to describe the word in largely mathematical and quantifiable terms and this has 
produced great predictive and instrumental success. However, we have no good reason for thinking that such a 
description is exhaustive of the nature of matter, indeed given the difficulty of understanding the mental on such a 
reductionist framework we have compelling reason for thinking that physics is capturing only a part of reality. 
Moreover, even the discoveries of physics themselves, particularly since the rise of quantum mechanics in the early 
twentieth-century, point towards a view of the world that is not made up of solid, inert, grainy particles, but is a 
swirl of forces, energy, fields and “an ethereally radiant vibrancy.” When philosophers complain that the mind could 
not arise out of the brain, “being a hunk of matter in space,” or just “soggy grey matter,” it is not merely the 
reduction of the mind that is at stake, but the unjustified reduction of matter. Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame: 
Conscious Minds in a Material World (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999), 115. Susan Greenfield, BBC 21 June 1997. 
cf. Strawson, Real Materialism, 42ff.  
27 For a historical survey, see David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005) and 
contemporary overview, see Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017).  
28 For a more thorough exposition of panpsychism see, Joanna Leidenhag, “Deploying Panpsychism for the 
Demarcation of Panentheism,” in Panentheism and Panpsychism: Philosophy of Religion Meets Philosophy of Mind, eds. 
Godehard Brüntrup, Benedikt Paul Göcke, Ludwig Jaskolla. Paderborn (Germany: Mentis Verlag, forthcoming).   
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be an electron (or some other fundamental entity). Panexperientialists are typically Process 
philosophers who also posit the same qualitative raw experience, sometimes with additional 
capacities such as spontaneity, but without a subject to enjoy these experiences. Lastly, 
panprotopsychists argue that there are no phenomenal properties (subjects or experiences), but 
only that which is necessary for phenomenal properties to later emerge, perhaps qualities or 
intentional states.29  
Since I am unsure what it means for experiences to exist without subjects, and since proto-
phenomenal properties are a fairly mysterious category that is not clearly any more fit as a 
substrate of consciousness than the typical emergentist’s physical substrate, subject panpsychists 
appear to me to be in the least-worst position. Although this subjectivity is more basic than can 
really be imagined or articulated, what subject panpsychism additionally offers is a basic 
interiority to all things. The Interiority Argument for panpsychism is one of the oldest, and it 
states that mentality is part of the indwelling powers that form the quiddity of things and 
structure causation throughout the universe. That is, panpsychism is tied to an Aristotelian 
powers view of causation.  
Due to the commitment of fundamental monism, the second question can only have two 
answers. The fundamental level of reality is either at the micro- or the macro-level; that is, either 
the basic building-blocks of reality are fundamental and all is built from them, or the universe as 
a whole should be taken as fundamental and all else is an aspect or part of it. The latter view, 
known as cosmopsychism, is a position with an increasing number of adherents, and yet it is still 
safe to say that the majority of panpsychists assume the former, that the basic building-blocks of 
reality are what is to be thought of as fundamental. This presupposition arises out of, as David 
Chalmers writes, a desire not only to “take consciousness seriously”, but also to “take science 
seriously”.30 Thomas Nagel’s panpsychism may also be characterised as resulting from a 
commitment to both mental realism and scientific credibility, particularly a desire to find an 
explanation of consciousness that fits within a general – but not materialist neo-Darwinian – 
theory of evolution.31 As Rowan Williams writes, “human intelligence itself is grounded in the 
long continues of animate life and its evolution, not something parachuted in to the created 
 
29 Sam Coleman, “Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One’s Mind,” in Panpsychism: Contemporary 
Perspectives, eds. Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 249-282 and Karl 
Pfeifer, “Pantheism and panpsychism,” in Alternative Conceptions of God: Essays on the metaphysics of the divine (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 41-49.  
30 David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search for a Fundamental Theory of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), xii-xiii. 
31 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
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order”.32 Chalmers’ argument runs that if consciousness is “a scientific subject matter”, then 
although it “is not open to investigation by the usual methods”, it can still be explained by the 
usual scientific structure; namely, “a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws.”33 
As such, there need be “nothing particularly spiritual or mystical” about fundamental phenomenal 
entities and psychophysical laws.34 In keeping with this concern about creeping spirituality, 
Chalmers used to refer to his position as “naturalistic dualism”.35  
Far from threatening Christian theology, I suggest that Chalmers’ naturalisation of panpsychism, 
as a kind of ‘dualism all the way down’, is an important step in constructing theological 
panpsychism. This is because Chalmers’ description of consciousness as a purely natural, or 
created, phenomenon provides an important buffer against mischaracterisations of the soul as 
‘divine’, a little piece of God, or autonomously immortal.36 If consciousness were a divinely 
transcendent phenomenon or slice of uncreated light, then any realist philosophy of mind would 
slide towards emergent theism, panentheism, pantheism, or polytheism. Consciousness, in 
Christian theology, must remain a created phenomenon of creaturely minds that, in keeping with 
the principle of creatio ex nihilo, neither emanates from God nor collectively constitutes a divine 
mind or world-soul. By arguing for fundamental consciousness as “just another natural 
phenomenon”, Chalmers points the way forward for a Christian panpsychism to posit creaturely 
or created finite minds throughout the universe as fundamental and possibly ubiquitous, without 
implying that these minds are identical to God or in any way constitutive of divinity.  
This is not to say that panpsychism should be combined with metaphysical or methodological 
naturalism. As a position that is realist about mentality, I am not sure that ‘naturalistic 
panpsychism’ is, in fact, a tenable position; at least not on any defensible definition of naturalism 
I am yet to come across. Yet, Chalmers’ argument illustrates that panpsychism does not entail 
any specific doctrine of God. This is particularly important for this paper, since panpsychism has 
 
32 Rowan Williams, Christ The Heart of Creation, (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 223.  
33 David J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness,” in Explaining Consciousness: The Hard 
Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 20; Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, xiv. Chalmers makes the 
comparison to James Clerk Maxwell’s idea that electromagnetic forces had to be taken as fundamental, as well as 
positing new laws governing these forces, in order to explain the apparently spooky effect of electric and magnetic 
phenomena. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 127. Thomas Nagel makes a very similar case for the scientific status for 
panpsychism when he writes, “Major scientific advances often require the creation of new concepts, postulating 
unobservable elements of reality that are needed to explain how natural regularities that initially appear accidental are 
in fact necessary.” Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 42. For more on panpsychism and the science-religion dialogue, see 
Joanna Leidenhag, “The Revival of Panpsychism and its Relevance for the Science-Religion Dialogue,” Theology & 
Science 17, n.10 (2019): 90-106.   
34 Chalmers, “Facing Up,” 20. 
35 Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, 128.  
36 Skrbina, for example, writes that panpsychism is incompatible with monotheistic religion because, “In all 
monotheistic Western religions, humans alone possess a divine and immortal soul.” David Skrbina, “Panpsychism in 
history: An overview,” in Mind That Abides, ed. David Skrbina (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2009), 1.  
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historical associations with pantheism, panentheism, and Process theism.37 Yet, as should be 
clear by now and contrary to these three historical associations, it is perfectly possible for a 
panpsychist to hold to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and posit an absolute divide between 
Creator and uncreated, whilst holding that no such strict divide exists between the material and 
the mental aspects of creation. Theological panpsychism, then, imagines a creation not only as 
gift, but as a gift filled with mentality, and so with meaning, value, and purpose down to its most 
basic fundamental structures; creation as a gift that can keep on receiving the presence of God.  
Towards a Panpsychist Creation 
So far, I have introduced panpsychism, and argued for its compatibility with the traditional 
monotheisms of the Abrahamic faiths and the ex nihilo doctrine. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo 
is essential for a view of creation that overcomes the bifurcation between nature and culture, but 
it leaves unanswered the question as to what type of creation God has, in fact, created out of 
nothing. By uniting mind and matter, panpsychism goes a long way towards providing an 
ontological underpinning to ‘creation’ as a matrix that unifies nature and culture. The following 
section develops this theological panpsychism by exploring a more explicitly Trinitarian doctrine 
of creation. In so doing, this section completes the argument of this paper that panpsychism 
should be an ontology that contemporary theologians see as a potential ally.  
Above, Simon Oliver’s chapter in Knowing Creation was used to explain how the category of 
creation might nullify the modern bifurcation between nature and culture. Oliver’s argument 
relied on an Aristotelian powers-ontology, whereby God creates ex nihilo creatures who have a 
nature such that the world is full of intrinsic powers, including the power for humans to 
construct a variety of amazing cultures and cultural artefacts. God creates being in general as well 
as the intrinsic powers with which particular beings practice meaning-making activities. In this 
doctrine of creation, culture is located within the natural, such that nature always already contains 
elements of culture. This power-based ontology is found not only in hylomorphism, but also in 
panpsychism where psyche forms the basis for interiority and powers, not only for humanity but 
for all creatures. Not only is panpsychism equally accommodating to a powers-ontology as 
hylomorphism, but it has the additional benefit of locating intrinsic powers alongside a 
fundamental receptivity. This is not only the reception of being, but the reception of God’s 
presence as an experiential phenomenon, and with this divine address and divine presence, the 
 
37 See, Joanna Leidenhag, “Building God’s Mind? A Study on the Relationship between Panpsychism and 
Panentheism,” Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-
0688-z and Leidenhag, “Deploying Panpsychism”.   
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reception of meaning. Such an ontology provides a strong basis for concepts such as a God who 
“nudges” creation in certain evolutionary directions and a view of divine action that “cannot help 
being personal because God essentially acts through intellect and will.”38 
When Schwöbel writes that God invests “not only humans beings but the whole of creation” 
with the capacity to experience the divine presence and respond to God in praise, this can be 
taken with the same metaphorical realism that the Hebrew poets employed throughout the 
Psalms and the prophets, and which can be found in Luke 19:40 and Rom 8:19-22.39 Whilst non-
human creatures may not speak in audio or in sentences, they may still praise and proclaim, 
lament and groan, and respond to the command and call to worship. Modern Western 
sensibilities will likely find this too far-fetched, but as Eastman warned in the case of human 
beings, the fittingness of the receivers is conditioned by nothing but the desire of God for 
relationship with creatures, and I am arguing this applies to all creation.  
Not only does panpsychism facilitate purpose within creation, as the intrinsic teleology within all 
things that Oliver speaks off, but it may aid theologians in articulating a Christian vision of the 
purpose of creation in toto; to receive the divine presence. This is something discussed in both 
John H. Walton’s chapter on Genesis and Marilyn McCord Adams’ two chapters on God’s 
sanctification and solidarity with creation. Walton argues that to an ancient audience, Genesis 1 
would have had nothing to do with material origins, but would have been read as God’s 
“mission statement for the cosmos . . . that it would becomes sacred space by virtue of his 
presence here dwelling in relationship to his people.”40 The creation is not by itself sacred, but 
God’s “presence creates sacred space.”41 As priests in this temple, and with Jesus as the great 
high priest of all creation, humanity’s role is to call all creatures to praise God.42  
As McCord Adams notes, these cultic categories with which Genesis describes creation 
“presuppose personal agency and purposive action”.43 Whilst she speaks of God’s sanctifying 
 
38 McCord Adams, “Sanctifying Matter,” 174, 177.  
39 David Horrell and Dominic Coad, “‘The stones would cry out’ Luke 19:40: a Lukan contribution to a 
hermeneutics of creation’s praise,” Scottish Journal of Theology 64 (2011): 29-44; Brendan Byrne, “An Ecological 
Reading of Romans 8:19-20: Problems and Possibilities,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical, and Theological 
Perspectives, eds. David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, and Christopher Southgate (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 83-93; 
Cherryl Hunt, David G. Horrell and Christopher Southgate, “An Environmental Mantra?: Ecological Interest in 
Romans 8.19-23 and a Modest Proposal for its Narrative Interpretation,” Journal of Theological Studies 59, n.2 (2008): 
546-79.  
40 John H. Walton, “Origins In Genesis: Claims of an Ancient Text in Modern Scientific World,” in Knowing Creation: 
Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, eds. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2018), 114.  
41 Walton, “Origins In Genesis,” 115.  
42 McCord Adams, “Sanctifying Matter,” 177.  
43 McCord Adams, “Sanctifying Matter,” 176.  
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presence as part of God’s omnipresent concurrence, she also speaks of this sanctification and 
solidarity with material creation as to do with the perichoretic structure of persons, both in the 
Trinity and material persons.44 “God’s overarching purpose”, she writes, “is to sanctify matter, to 
make it holy first and foremost by indwelling material persons.”45 Persons, Adams suggests, are 
created not only for intersubjective relationship with each other and with God, but for a more 
radically perichoretic overlapping at their functional core. The very serious possibility that 
panpsychism raises is that the psycho-materiality that undergirds this personhood is not an all-or-
nothing category that humanity alone has access to but comes in degrees and is found 
throughout creation. Perhaps the interconnected psycho-materiality of our bodies, of all the 
organisms that live in and through our bodies, and the chemical composition that holds traces of 
galactic magnitude, all speak to this perichoretic notion of personhood. On panpsychism, God’s 
sanctifying omnipresence might manifest not only in causal concurrence, but dwell experientially 
in all corners of the universe. It is through such relationships, where God is closer to all things 
than they are to themselves (since most do not have self-awareness or self-consciousness), that 
we can then speak of the Spirit’s sanctifying omnipresence in every subject that fills the cosmos. 
This is not to point to a discrete place where God can be found, nor is it to posit consciousness 
as a necessary mediating substance between Creator and creation; the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo affirmed in this paper precludes either of these ideas. Instead, theological panpsychism 
offers a way to articulate how God may be ‘in and beyond’ the whole of creation, immaterial and 
material, cultural and natural.46 
Conclusion  
This paper has considered a common argument in the contemporary doctrine of creation, 
represented throughout the two volumes Knowing Creation and Christ and the Created Order; namely, 
the argument that the doctrine of creation, unites the (modern and devastating) bifurcation 
between ‘nature’ – my which we mean the material world available for investigation by the 
natural sciences – and ‘culture’ – by which we mean the meaning-making acts and artefacts 
investigated by the human and social sciences or the arts. The doctrine of creation it is argued 
concerns the actualisation of a world that is made with intrinsic powers for continuing reception 
and response, such that this world has a nature that is always and already encultured. This paper 
extended this vision of creation by adding to it an ontology called ‘theological panpsychism’, that 
 
44 McCord Adams, “Sanctifying Matter,” 175.  
45 Marilyn McCord Adams “For Better for Worse Solidarity,” in Christ and the Created Order: Perspectives for Theology, 
Philosophy, and Science, ed. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 173.  
46 This was a favourite phrase of Erich Przywara, favoured by Williams, Christ the Heart, 223-4 and Kathryn 
Sonderegger, Systematic Theology: The Doctrine of God (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2015), 130. 
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argues that God included mentality in the fundamental features of the cosmos in the first act of 
creation. The mentality within fundamental entities is a kind of interior power and receptivity, 
which this paper argued provides an ontological underpinning for God not only to empower as a 
primary cause, but for Jesus to enter into a better-or-worse relationship with, and for the Spirit 
to be present within, all of creation. Theological panpsychism does not entail this Trinitarian 
doctrine of creation, but it provides invaluable metaphysical resources for theologians to 
articulate this vision of the created order and contribute to reconciliation between humanity and 
the non-human world. 
 
 
